An active-contracting perspective on equilibrium selection in relational contracts
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Miller, David A. ; Watson, Joel |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 179.2023, 3/4, p. 530-561
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Subject: | equilibrium selection | active contracting | bargaining power | relation-ships | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Verhandlungsmacht | Bargaining power | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Tarifverhandlungen | Collective bargaining | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vertrag | Contract |
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