An evolutionary game theoretic model of whistleblowing behaviour in organizations
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Quinteros, María J. ; Villena, Marcelo J. ; Villena, Mauricio G. |
Published in: |
IMA journal of management mathematics. - Oxford : Univ. Press, ISSN 1471-6798, ZDB-ID 2045093-X. - Vol. 33.2022, 2, p. 289-314
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Subject: | whistleblowing | corruption | social norms | evolutionary games | incentives | Korruption | Corruption | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | Evolutionary game theory | Whistleblowing | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Soziale Norm | Social norm | Evolutionsökonomik | Evolutionary economics | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma |
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