An existence result for discontinuous games
We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and show that it, together with a weak form of payoff security, is enough to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave normal form games. We show that our result generalizes the pure strategy existence theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin [P. Dasgupta, E. Maskin, The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, I: Theory, Rev. Econ. Stud. 53 (1986) 1-26] and that it is neither implied nor does it imply the existence theorems of Baye, Tian, and Zhou [M. Baye, G. Tian, J. Zhou, Characterizations of the existence of equilibria in games with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs, Rev. Econ. Stud. 60 (1993) 935-948] and Reny [P. Reny, On the existence of pure and mixed strategy equilibria in discontinuous games, Econometrica 67 (1999) 1029-1056]. Furthermore, we show that an equilibrium may fail to exist when, while maintaining weak payoff security, weak upper semicontinuity is weakened to reciprocal upper semicontinuity.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Carmona, Guilherme |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 144.2009, 3, p. 1333-1340
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Discontinuous games Nash equilibrium Upper semicontinuity Lower semicontinuity |
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