An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable
Year of publication: |
1998
|
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Authors: | Feinberg, Yossi |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 24.1998, 1, p. 2-9
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Koalition | Coalition | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Theorie | Theory |
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