An n-person Rubinstein bargaining game

When Herrero (1985) extends Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offers bargaining model to the case of three or more players any agreement can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, given a sufficiently large discount factor. We show that this is not the case when players demand shares for themselves instead of proposing agreements to each other. Although it is possible to rule out agreements, the majority remains to be SPE outcomes.

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Year of publication:	2005-06-19
Authors:	Torstensson, Pär
Institutions:	Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan
Subject:	Multilateral bargaining \| n-person bargaining \| subgame perfect equilibria

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in International Game Theory Review, 2009, pages 111-115. The text is part of a series Working Papers Number 2005:39 5 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034152