Analysis of dynamics of voting system for small number of candidates
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gohar, Neelam ; Saman, Gul E. ; Noor, Salma ; Aslam, Sehrish ; Khan, Maryam ; Qadeer, Anam ; Qayum, Fawad |
Published in: |
Computational and mathematical organization theory. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media, ISSN 1381-298X, ZDB-ID 1305080-1. - Vol. 25.2019, 3, p. 225-246
|
Subject: | Manipulation | Rationality | Preference aggregation | Game theory | Multi-agent systems (MASs) | Computational social choice | Spieltheorie | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
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