Are relative performance measures in CEO incentive contracts used for risk reduction and/or for strategic interaction?
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Vrettos, Dimitris |
Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Sarasota, Fla. : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 88.2013, 6, p. 2179-2212
|
Subject: | CEO compensation | managerial incentives | strategic interaction | product market competition | strategic substitutes | strategic complements | relative performance measures | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Performance-Messung | Performance measurement | Strategisches Management | Strategic management | Theorie | Theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Wettbewerb | Competition |
-
Rivals risk-taking incentives and firm corporate policy
Abdoh, Hussein, (2023)
-
Managerial incentives and IT strategic posture
Xue, Ling, (2017)
-
Cost shielding in executive bonus plans
Bloomfield, Matthew, (2021)
- More ...
-
The Use of Management Control Mechanisms to Mitigate Moral Hazard in the Decision to Outsource
SEDATOLE, KAREN L., (2012)
-
Park, Hyungshin, (2015)
-
Campbell, Dennis W., (2012)
- More ...