Cost shielding in executive bonus plans
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Bloomfield, Matthew ; Gipper, Brandon ; Kepler, John D. ; Tsui, David |
Published in: |
Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 72.2021, 2/3, p. 1-24
|
Subject: | Agency theory | Bonus contracts | Cost shielding | Executive compensation | Managerial incentives | Performance measurement | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Performance-Messung | Theorie | Theory |
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