Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation : executives are paid for (good) luck but not punished for bad
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Garvey, Gerald T. ; Milbourn, Todd T. |
Publisher: |
Claremont, CA : Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics |
Subject: | Vergütungssystem | Führungskräfte | Agency Theory | Benchmarking | Aktienmarkt | Vereinigte Staaten |
Series: | Claremont Colleges Working Papers ; 2003-01 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 366459384 [GVK] hdl:10419/23376 [Handle] |
Source: |
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Garvey, Gerald, (2003)
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