Auctionning Public Goods to Groups of Agents.

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group with the highest sum of the agents' bids, only if this sum exceeds a minimum price declared previously by the auctioneer.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Alboth, D. ; Lerner, A. ; Shalev, J.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| INFORMATION

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	32 pages
Classification:	C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779435