Profit Maximising in Auctions of Public Goods.

A profit maximising auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve price declared previously by the auctioneer.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Alboth, D. ; Lerner, A. ; Shalev, J.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	PUBLIC GOODS \| INFORMATION \| GAME THEORY

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	32 pages
Classification:	C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779432