Auctions when Bidders Prepare by Investing in Ideas

We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Jeitschko, Thomas D. ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Auctions \| procurement

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 258
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	757238114 [GVK] hdl:10419/75504 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_258 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010314867