Bank Size, Reputation, and Debt Renegotiation

Raquel Fernandez, David Kaaret

This paper examines the effect that the coexistence of small and large banks, with different interests in the international market, has on the debt renegotiation process. Making use of a reputational model, we argue that the presence of small banks implies that debtor countries have a harder tine obtaining new money than what they would have absent the small banks

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Year of publication:	September 1988
Authors:	Fernandez, Raquel
Other Persons:	Kaaret, David (contributor)
Institutions:	National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor)
Publisher:	Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research
Subject:	Bank \| Reputation \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Kredit \| Credit \| Schuldenmanagement \| Debt management \| Betriebsgröße \| Firm size

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Series:	NBER working paper series ; no. w2704
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers.
Other identifiers:	10.3386/w2704 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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