Union Delegation and Incentives for Merger

We analyze a unionized duopoly model to examine how unions affect the incentives for merger. We find that, once the union has the option to delegate, an increase in the union bargaining power can create incentives for the firms to merge.

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Year of publication:	2002-01-01
Authors:	MAULEON, Ana ; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J.
Institutions:	Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	Union delegation \| Wage bargaining \| Mergers

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Number 2002010 7 pages long
Classification:	J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; J50 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining. General ; J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985140