Bargaining with Many Players: A Limit Result

We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is interpreted in terms of Walrasian market for being the first proposer.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Kultti, Klaus ; Vartiainen, Hannu
Publisher:	Turku : Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Subject:	non-cooperative bargaining \| stationary equilibrium \| replication \| Walrasian market

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Series:	Discussion paper ; 32
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/233248 [Handle] RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp32 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012502986