Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma : generous tit-for-tat strategy
Hitoshi Matsushima
| Year of publication: |
2020
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Matsushima, Hitoshi |
| Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 20.2020, 1, p. 1-11
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| Subject: | behavioral equilibrium | generous tit-for-tat strategy | imperfect private monitoring | naïveté | reciprocity | repeated prisoner’s dilemma | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma | Theorie | Theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
Online Resource
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1515/bejte-2019-0030 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012170701