Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma : generous tit-for-tat strategy
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Matsushima, Hitoshi |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 20.2020, 1, p. 1-11
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Subject: | behavioral equilibrium | generous tit-for-tat strategy | imperfect private monitoring | naïveté | reciprocity | repeated prisoner’s dilemma | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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