Binding Promises and Cooperation among Strangers

In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Camera, Gabriele ; Casari, Marco ; Bigoni, Maria
Institutions:	Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of Business and Economics
Subject:	coordination \| cheap-talk \| deception \| repeated game \| social norms

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	26 pages
Classification:	C90 - Design of Experiments. General ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817383