Blowing the Whistle

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Apesteguia, José ; Dufwenberg, Martin ; Selten, Reinhard
Publisher:	Bonn : University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Subject:	Wettbewerbspolitik \| Kartellverfahren \| Straffreiheit \| Preiswettbewerb \| Experiment \| Anti-trust \| leniency \| immunity \| amnesty \| blow the whistle \| cartels \| pricecompetition \| Bertrand model \| experiment \| communication

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Series:	Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; 9/2003
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	374460868 [GVK] hdl:10419/22838 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:bonedp:92003 [RePEc]
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263063