Blowing the Whistle
Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.
Year of publication: |
2003-05-06
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Authors: | Apesteguia, Jose ; Dufwenberg, Martin ; Selten, Reinhard |
Institutions: | Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Stockholms Universitet |
Subject: | Anti-trust | leniency | immunity | amnesty | blow the whistle | cartels | price competition | Bertrand model | experiment | communication |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | The text is part of a series Research Papers in Economics Number 2003:5 29 pages |
Classification: | C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771101