But is it myopia? : risk aversion and the efficiency of stock-based managerial incentives
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Carmel, Jonathan |
Published in: |
Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Blackwell, ISSN 1058-6407, ZDB-ID 1123863-X. - Vol. 17.2008, 2, p. 541-579
|
Subject: | Aktienoption | Stock option | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Führungskräfte | Managers | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Theorie | Theory |
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