Cartel Size and Collusive Stability with Non-Capitalistic Players
Year of publication: |
2014-05
|
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Authors: | Delbono, F. ; Lambertini, L. |
Institutions: | Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance ; L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory |
Source: |
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Cartel size and collusive stability with non-capitalistic players
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