Optimal firm' mix in oligopoly with twofold environmental externality

We charaterise the socially optimal mix of firms in an oligopoly with both profit-seeking and labour-managed firms. The policy maker faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pollutes the environment. We study the relationship between firms' mix and social welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the industry and the resulting policy implications.

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Year of publication:	2014-07
Authors:	Delbono, F. ; Lambertini, L.
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; P13 - Cooperative Enterprises ; Q50 - Environmental Economics. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010859798