Cartel Stability and Quality Signaling.

Under Cournot and Bertrand cases, cartel stability is investigated in a context of adverse selection, where consumers are imperfectly informed about the products quality. Producers' collusion may be necessary to signal quality via a third-party certification or a price. In particular, cases with and without economies of scale concerning third-party certification are examined.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Marette, S. ; Crepsi, J.M.
Institutions:	Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.
Subject:	OLIGOPOLIES \| MARKET STRUCTURE

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Series:	Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	45 pages
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618896