Cash holdings and CEO risk incentive compensation : effect of CEO risk aversion
Year of publication: |
2018
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Authors: | Feng, Harry ; Rao, Ramesh P. |
Published in: |
International review of financial analysis. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1057-5219, ZDB-ID 1133622-5. - Vol. 60.2018, p. 162-176
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Subject: | Cash holdings | CEO compensation | Managerial risk aversion | Risk incentives | Führungskräfte | Managers | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Cash-Management | Cash management | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Risiko | Risk | Betriebliche Liquidität | Corporate liquidity | Theorie | Theory | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude |
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