Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
Year of publication: |
September 2015
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Authors: | Sugaya, Takuo |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 10.2015, 3, p. 691-717
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Subject: | Repeated games | unequal discounting | imperfect monitoring | folk theorem | Wiederholte Spiele | Diskontierung | Discounting | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1425 [DOI] hdl:10419/150260 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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