Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Sugaya, Takuo |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 10.2015, 3, p. 691-717
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Subject: | Repeated games | unequal discounting | imperfect monitoring | folk theorem | Diskontierung | Discounting | Wiederholte Spiele | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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