Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments
Year of publication: |
[2001]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Keefer, Philip |
Other Persons: | Stasavage, David (contributor) |
Institutions: | World Bank / Development Research Group / Regulation and Competition Policy (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Wechselkurspolitik | Exchange rate policy | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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