Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Keefer, Philip ; Stasavage, David |
Published in: |
International organization : IO. - Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, ISSN 0020-8183, ZDB-ID 207420-5. - Vol. 56.2002, 4, p. 751-774
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Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Wechselkurspolitik | Exchange rate policy | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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