Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information

We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Konrad, Kai A.
Other Persons:	Thum, Marcel P. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Verhandlungen \| Negotiations \| Klimawandel \| Climate change \| Internationale Klimapolitik \| International climate policy \| Politische Entscheidung \| Political decision \| Zwei-Länder-Modell \| Two-country model

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (16 p)
Series:	Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper ; No. 2011-19
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 9, 2011 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1971638 [DOI]
Classification:	Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters ; Q58 - Government Policy ; F53 - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113305