Comment on "optimal contract to induce continued effort"
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cao, Ping ; Tian, Feng ; Sun, Peng |
Other Persons: | Sun, Peng (contributor) ; Tian, Feng (contributor) |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5501, ZDB-ID 2023019-9. - Vol. 68.2022, 1, p. 796-808
|
Subject: | dynamic | moral hazard | optimal control | jump process | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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