Optimal contract to induce continued effort
Peng Sun, Feng Tian
| Year of publication: |
September 2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Sun, Peng ; Tian, Feng |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 64.2018, 9, p. 4193-4217
|
| Subject: | dynamic | moral hazard | optimal control | jump process | principal-agent model | continuous time | Poisson | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Stochastischer Prozess | Stochastic process | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2826 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011921512