Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability
Year of publication: |
November 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Arribillaga, R. Pablo ; Massó, Jordi |
Published in: |
American economic journal : a journal of the American Economic Association. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1945-7669, ZDB-ID 2442378-6. - Vol. 9.2017, 4, p. 74-107
|
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Manipulation | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
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