Competing commitments : technocracy and democracy in the design of monetary institutions
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Freeman, John R. |
Published in: |
International organization : IO. - Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, ISSN 0020-8183, ZDB-ID 207420-5. - Vol. 56.2002, 4, p. 889-910
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Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Demokratie | Democracy | Institutionenökonomik | Institutional economics | Zentralbank | Central bank |
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