Competing commitments : technocracy and democracy in the design of monetary institutions
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Freeman, John R. |
Published in: |
The political economy of monetary institutions. - Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] : MIT Press, ISBN 0-262-52414-7. - 2003, p. 197-218
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Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Demokratie | Democracy | Institutionenökonomik | Institutional economics | Zentralbank | Central bank |
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