Competition for talent under performance manipulation
Year of publication: |
August 2017
|
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Authors: | Marinovic, Iván ; Povel, Paul |
Published in: |
Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 64.2017, 1, p. 1-14
|
Subject: | Executive compensation | Competition for talent | Adverse selection | Moral hazard | Misreporting | Performance manipulation | Earnings management | Adverse Selektion | Moral Hazard | Bilanzpolitik | Accounting policy | Wettbewerb | Competition | Theorie | Theory | Managervergütung | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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