Continuous-time games with imperfect and abrupt information
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Bernard, Benjamin |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies : RES. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Pr., ISSN 1467-937X, ZDB-ID 2009656-2. - Vol. 91.2024, 4, p. 1988-2052
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Subject: | Repeated games | Continuous time | Information arrival | Imperfect observability | Equilibrium characterization | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
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