Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality : when does one size fit all?
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Balmaceda M., Felipe |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 49.2020, 2, p. 601-637
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Subject: | Moral hazard | Adverse selection | Limited liability | Monotonicity | Optimal mechanism | Theorie | Theory | Adverse Selektion | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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