Contracts and productive information gathering
We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the state of nature, the agent has to incur a cost, (g) , to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, depending on the value of (g), incite the agent to gather or not to gather information. We study tradeoffs that are involved
Year of publication: |
1997-01-01
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Authors: | Cremer, J. ; Khalil, F. ; Rochet, J-C. |
Institutions: | Economics Division, University of Southampton |
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