Controlling innovative projects with moral hazard and asymmetric information
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Bergmann, Rouven ; Friedl, Gunther |
Published in: |
Research policy : policy, management and economic studies of science, technology and innovation. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0048-7333, ZDB-ID 121149-3. - Vol. 37.2008, 9, p. 1504-1514
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Subject: | Industrieforschung | Industrial research | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory |
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