Controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Montez, João |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 46.2015, 3, p. 650-670
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Subject: | Preisbindung | Resale price maintenance | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy | Monopol | Monopoly |
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