One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Montez, João |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 152.2014, p. 249-265
|
Subject: | One-to many bargaining | Pairwise bargaining | Nucleolus | Tarifverhandlungen | Collective bargaining | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations |
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