Cooperation in the Presence of an Advantaged Outsider
Year of publication: |
2012-08
|
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Authors: | Cheikbossian, Guillaume ; Mahenc, Philippe |
Institutions: | Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) |
Subject: | Repeated Game | Tacit Collusion | Optimal Punishments | Cost Asymmetry | Outsider |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series TSE Working Paper Number 13-390 |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Source: |
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