Corporate governance and employee treatment : evidence from takeover defenses
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Unsal, Omer ; Rayfield, Blake |
Published in: |
Journal of economics and finance : JEF. - New York, NY : Springer, ISSN 1938-9744, ZDB-ID 2069807-0. - Vol. 44.2020, 2, p. 361-391
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Subject: | CEO tenure | CEO pay | Labor litigation | Labor law | Führungskräfte | Managers | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Übernahme | Takeover | Arbeitsrecht | Labour law | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Lohn | Wages | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Betriebszugehörigkeit | Job tenure |
Description of contents: | Description [doi.org] |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Corrigendum auf den Seiten 392-416 |
Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s12197-019-09478-4 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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