Incentivizing CEOs via pay and forced turnover : do tenure and managerial ability matter?
Nadide Banu Olcay Güner
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Banu Olcay Güner, Nadide |
Published in: |
Theoretical and applied economics : GAER review. - Bucureşti : AGER, ISSN 1841-8678, ZDB-ID 2640970-7. - Vol. 30.2023, 1/634, p. 37-66
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Subject: | incentives | CEO pay | CEO dismissal | managerial ability | job tenure | Führungskräfte | Managers | Arbeitsmobilität | Labour mobility | Betriebszugehörigkeit | Job tenure | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Lohn | Wages | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Kündigung | Dismissal | Qualifikation | Occupational qualification | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance |
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