Corporate merger, organizational form, and control of labor

This paper shows that, when two firms merge, the increase in the bargaining strength of the multiproduct firm arising from the merger when negotiating uniform wages with the workers is one of the reasons that account for corporate mergers. Moreover, there is a strategic variable that can be used to decrease union rents in the case of merging, namely, the organization of production decisions.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2000-09-20
Authors:	Bárcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos ; Garzón, María Begoña
Published in:	Spanish Economic Review. - Asociación Española de Economía - AEE. - Vol. 2.2000, 2, p. 129-144
Publisher:	Asociación Española de Economía - AEE
Subject:	Mergers \| multiproduct firms \| wage bargaining

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives Structure, and Effects ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371303