Cost Shielding in Executive Bonus Plans
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Bloomfield, Matthew J. |
Other Persons: | Gipper, Brandon (contributor) ; Kepler, John D. (contributor) ; Tsui, David (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (84 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 24, 2020 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3525148 [DOI] |
Classification: | G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; M12 - Personnel Management |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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