Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Orlov, Dmitry |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 206.2022, p. 1-37
|
Subject: | Communication | Dynamic contracts | Interventions | Monitoring | Performance evaluations | Repeated moral hazard | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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