Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Brocas, Isabelle |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 50.2014, p. 22-33
|
Subject: | Auctions | Type-dependent externalities | Countervailing incentives | Mechanism design | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Anreiz | Incentives |
-
Optical allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
Brocas, Isabelle, (2013)
-
An incentive mechanism for private parking-sharing programs in an imperfect information setting
Yan, Pengyu, (2023)
-
Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
Ehlers, Lars H., (2020)
- More ...
-
Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: An experimental investigation
Otamendi, F. Javier, (2018)
-
Designing Auctions in R&D: Optimal Licensing of an Innovation
Brocas, Isabelle, (2006)
-
The development of randomization and deceptive behavior in mixed strategy games
Brocas, Isabelle, (2022)
- More ...