Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Brocas, Isabelle |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 50.2014, p. 22-33
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Subject: | Auctions | Type-dependent externalities | Countervailing incentives | Mechanism design | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Allokation | Allocation | Anreiz | Incentives | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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