Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments
Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent
| Year of publication: |
2019
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Manelli, Alejandro Marcelo ; Vincent, Daniel Robert |
| Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 82.2019, p. 214-226
|
| Subject: | Bayesian incentive compatibility | Dominant strategy incentive compatibility | Multi-dimensional mechanism design | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.002 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012105841