Cournot competition among multiproduct firms:specialization through licensing

In a duopoly where each firm produces substitute goods, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage. Patent pool extension confirms the results.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006-12
Authors:	Filippini, Luigi
Institutions:	Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Subject:	cross-licensing \| patent pool \| specialization \| process innovation

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in International Journal of Business and Economics, 5(3), 2006, pp. 201-210. Number itemq0542 10 pages
Classification:	D45 - Rationing; Licensing ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113996